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ABSTRACT—We have a First Amendment right to criticize the government. 
But this freedom does not translate into a right to criticize one’s boss even 
if, as for millions of Americans, one’s boss happens to be a government 
employer. Public employee speech doctrine has long established wide 
latitude for public employers to supervise their workers. Employees must 
show at the threshold that their speech was on a matter of public concern and 
not an internal workplace matter. The Supreme Court’s pronouncements 
over the last decade in a related doctrinal area, however, have unsettled the 
line demarcating workplace speech. In its agency fees cases, the Court has 
repeatedly stated that when a union speaks on matters of interest to the 
general public, even internal workplace matters, it triggers constitutional 
scrutiny. Taken at face value, the new definition of matters of public concern 
in a government workplace provides a basis for employees to claim 
expanded free speech protection. This Note is the first scholarly work to 
propose how public employees will claim expanded speech protection on the 
basis of the Court’s holding in Janus v. American Federation of State, 
County, and Municipal Employees (AFSCME). The expanded definition of 
matters of public concern is likely to destabilize public employee speech 
doctrine, causing uncertainty for employers as to how to supervise 
employees in compliance with the First Amendment. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Individuals have a First Amendment right to criticize the government, 
even if their speech is insulting, vulgar, racist, or untrue.1 For government 
employees, however, this does not translate to freedom to criticize one’s 
boss. Over twenty million people work in the public sector, including 
teachers, police officers, firefighters, prison guards, and social workers, as 
well as workers in federal, state, and local governments and agencies.2 The 
Supreme Court has recognized that the government requires wide latitude to 
adequately supervise these employees—including the power to regulate 
employee speech. Without this latitude, a public workplace could transform 
into a town hall meeting of employee grievances. Most employee speech 
constitutes internal workplace speech. Only when government workers 
speak as citizens on a matter of public concern can they receive First 
Amendment protection. Thus, the government’s ability to efficiently 
function depends on the contours of how the Court defines workplace 
speech. 
 
 1 R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391 (1992) (striking down a hate crime ordinance); Cohen 
v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 19–21 (1971) (holding that vulgar speech like “Fuck the Draft” expresses ideas 
protected by the First Amendment); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964) 
(prohibiting defamation suits by government officials absent evidence of actual malice). 
 2 ROBERT JESSE WILLHIDE, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, ANNUAL SURVEY OF PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT & 
PAYROLL SUMMARY REPORT: 2013, at 1–2, 8 (2014), https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/ 
library/publications/2014/econ/g13-aspep.pdf [https://perma.cc/9SJE-THNK]. As of March 2013, there 
were 21.8 million people working in the public sector. Id. at 2. 
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Consider the following example. Donald Olendzki, a psychologist at a 
state prison, was concerned that conditions for him and his fellow employees 
were dangerous.3 As a member of the executive board of his union, he began 
to raise these complaints to management.4 In union meetings, he told them 
that mentally ill inmates were causing unsafe conditions and that a dangerous 
dental tool had gone missing.5 In his capacity as a union board member, he 
accompanied a coworker to her disciplinary hearing.6 He also persistently 
spoke about his belief that the terms of the collective bargaining agreement 
were not being followed.7 In his lawsuit, Olendzki alleged that his superiors 
eventually retaliated against him for his advocacy.8 The Seventh Circuit held 
that he had not raised any issues that constituted a matter of public concern, 
and therefore, his speech was not protected by the First Amendment.9 
If Olendzki were to bring a case involving union-related speech today, 
it might turn out quite differently. Over the past decade, critics of unions 
have argued for a new definition of workplace speech in a closely-related 
doctrinal area: agency fees. A forty-year-old precedent established in Abood 
v. Detroit Board of Education had allowed unions to charge agency fees 
(colloquially known as “fair share dues”) to nonmembers to pay the costs of 
representing those employees who choose not to join the union.10 In a series 
of cases, opponents of agency fees argued that, when unions charge such fees 
to nonmembers, it violates the fee-payers’ First Amendment rights. These 
plaintiffs contended that, because collective bargaining affects government 
expenditures and public policy, agency fees “speak” on matters of public 
concern. Compelling nonmembers to pay agency fees thus amounted to 
unlawful forced speech. 
In 2018, the Supreme Court agreed. In Janus v. American Federation 
of State, County, and Municipal Employees (AFSCME), the Court overruled 
its precedent in Abood and held that agency fees are unconstitutional.11 In its 
opinion, the Court held that the topics of collective bargaining 
“overwhelmingly” involve matters of “great public concern.”12 This 
pronouncement was in sharp contrast to the well-established principle since 
Pickering v. Board of Education that, in the government workplace, matters 
 
 3 Olendzki v. Rossi, 765 F.3d 742, 744 (7th Cir. 2014). 
 4 Id. 
 5 Id. 
 6 Id. at 745. 
 7 Id. 
 8 Id. at 745–46. 
 9 Id. at 747–49. 
 10 See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977). 
 11 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2463–86 (2018). 
 12 Id. at 2475, 2477. 
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of public concern do not encompass all topics potentially interesting to the 
public.13 Now, with Janus, collective bargaining topics including wages, 
working conditions, and workplace operations appear to be back on the table 
as potentially “of public concern.” What had previously been considered an 
internal workplace matter about the prosaic operations of a government 
employer could turn into a constitutional case. 
It is not clear how the Court will grapple with the impact that the newly 
expansive definition of matters of public concern will have on public 
employee speech doctrine. Some have observed that the Court’s holding has 
created an inconsistency in First Amendment jurisprudence and could form 
the basis of new protections for public employees.14 This Note is the first 
scholarly exposition of how and why Janus will allow government workers 
to claim new protections. Specifically, it proposes that public employees can 
now argue for First Amendment protection when they speak (1) on union-
related topics, (2) as a union official, and (3) about workplace matters. And 
so long as they can demonstrate that their interest in speaking outweighs their 
employer’s interest in restricting their speech,15 public employees can win 
their cases. 
This Note proceeds as follows. Part I provides an overview of when the 
government may impinge on its employees’ First Amendment rights, in both 
public employee speech doctrine and agency fees doctrine. Then, Part II 
argues the two doctrines are inextricably connected because they govern the 
same workers, the same employers, and the same topics of speech—and 
because they both are grounded in the recognition that the government 
operates with great latitude when it acts as an employer. Part II further argues 
 
 13 391 U.S. 563, 563–64 (1968) (explaining that the employee’s speech was directed toward the 
public and was, therefore, a matter of public concern); see also Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 149 
(1983) (“To presume that all matters which transpire within a government office are of public concern 
would mean that virtually every remark—and certainly every criticism directed at a public official—
would plant the seed of a constitutional case.”). 
 14 See, e.g., Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2496 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“If all that speech really counted as ‘of 
public concern’ . . . the mass of public employees’ complaints (about pay and benefits and workplace 
policy and such) would become ‘federal constitutional issues.’” (quoting Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, 
564 U.S. 379, 391 (2011))); Brief for Amici Curiae Charles Fried & Robert C. Post in Support of Neither 
Party at 7, Janus, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (No. 16-1466); Catherine L. Fisk, Janus: Weaponized First Amendment 
Shoots at Democracy, ACSBLOG (July 2, 2018), https://www.acslaw.org/acsblog/janus-weaponized-first-
amendment-shoots-at-democracy [https://perma.cc/9U6P-L2AL] (arguing “the Court needs to explain 
why employees can get fired for complaining about their work, but not for refusing to pay fair share 
fees”); Ann C. Hodges, Beware the Unintended Consequences of Janus, ACSBLOG (Feb. 20, 2018), 
https://www.acslaw.org/acsblog/beware-the-unintended-consequences-of-janus [https://perma.cc/2CA4-
W5K4] (predicting that “[a] ruling in favor of the Janus plaintiffs could obliterate the distinction [between 
employee and citizen speech], requiring employers to tolerate much unwanted speech by their 
employees”). 
 15 See Connick, 461 U.S. at 150 (describing interest balancing in public employee speech doctrine). 
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that, when the Court ruled agency fees unconstitutional in Janus, it offered a 
new definition of matters of public concern, one that will collide with public 
employee speech doctrine. Finally, Part III evaluates the implications of the 
Janus Court’s holding that agency fees categorically speak on matters of 
public concern, arguing that it will create doctrinal uncertainty and offer a 
new basis for individual employees to claim First Amendment protection. 
I. FIRST AMENDMENT RESTRICTIONS ON THE GOVERNMENT  
AS EMPLOYER 
Public employees do not leave their constitutional rights at the door to 
the workplace. Nor do they have the same First Amendment freedoms as 
citizens in general. This Part explains how the First Amendment operates in 
a government workplace. In recognition of the government’s need to 
supervise its workforce and conduct labor relations without turning every 
matter into a constitutional case, the government receives significant latitude 
to regulate its employees’ speech. As Section I.A describes, when the 
government acts as employer, it must do so in a manner consistent with the 
First Amendment, which generally proscribes restrictions on the freedom of 
speech. Section I.B explains that public employee speech doctrine allows a 
government employer flexibility to supervise its employees’ speech except 
where employees express themselves as citizens on matters of public 
concern. Historically, as Section I.C delineates, agency fees doctrine drew a 
line around activities related to union representation and collective 
bargaining. Until the Janus decision, a government employer could permit a 
public sector union to impose an agency fee for expenses germane to 
collective bargaining—but not political lobbying. 
A. First Amendment Protections Generally 
The First Amendment limits the federal government’s power to restrict 
speech and likewise applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Although the text of the First Amendment declares that “Congress shall 
make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech,”16 the freedom of speech 
is not absolute. Scholars observe that the Court has categorically provided 
less protection under the First Amendment to some kinds of expression based 
on the content of the speech.17 Particularly harmful expression including 
 
 16 U.S. CONST. amend. I. As Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. famously wrote, “The most stringent 
protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic.” 
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). 
 17 See, e.g., Robert C. Post, The Constitutional Concept of Public Discourse: Outrageous Opinion, 
Democratic Deliberation, and Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 103 HARV. L. REV. 601, 625 (1990) 
(describing the Court’s exclusion of obscenity from First Amendment protection). 
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libel, obscenity, and incitement receives little or no First Amendment 
protection.18 Conversely, the Court affords speech that contributes to the 
marketplace of ideas or promotes self-governance the highest levels of 
protection.19 In addition to these content-based distinctions, the First 
Amendment also allows the government a freer hand to regulate speech in 
certain spaces, including schools, prisons, and spaces on government 
property not traditionally open to the public.20 This extra operating room 
allows the government to efficiently run schools, penological institutions, 
and other government services. Thus, both the content and context of the 
speech matter when examining government regulations of speech. 
B. Public Employee Speech Doctrine 
Government employers at all levels are bound to supervise their 
employees in a manner consistent with the First Amendment.21 For example, 
although a private employee could be fired for speaking critically of the 
President at work, a public employee may claim First Amendment 
protection.22 Yet the rights of public employees are not absolute. The Court 
has recognized that, to efficiently provide public services, a government 
employer must have more latitude to supervise its employees than when it 
regulates its citizens.23 If employees possessed an absolute right to freedom 
of expression, it is easy to imagine how workplaces could become 
unmanageable. 
 
 18 N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964) (libel); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 
15, 23–24 (1973) (obscenity); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (incitement). 
 19 See Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 452 (2011) (noting that “speech on public issues occupies the 
highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values, and is entitled to special protection” (quoting 
Connick, 461 U.S. at 145)); see also Cynthia L. Estlund, Speech on Matters of Public Concern: The Perils 
of an Emerging First Amendment Category, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 47 (1990) (critiquing such 
content-based distinctions). 
 20 See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987) (permitting regulation for legitimate penological 
purposes); Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 54 (1983) (applying rational 
basis scrutiny to regulations limiting access to teacher mailboxes); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. 
Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507, 509 (1969) (permitting regulation of student speech if the targeted  speech 
would materially and substantially disrupt the learning environment). 
 21 Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 563, 574 (1968). In contrast, in the pre-Pickering era, 
then-Massachusetts Supreme Court Justice Holmes proclaimed, “The petitioner may have a constitutional 
right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman.” McAuliffe v. Mayor of New 
Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (Mass. 1892). 
 22 See Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 379–80 (1987) (holding a public employee had been 
improperly fired for criticizing the President and his policies). After the assassination attempt on President 
Ronald Reagan, McPherson had told a fellow employee, “If they go for him again, I hope they get him.” 
Id. at 380. 
 23 Pickering, 391 U.S. at 565. 
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The Court categorically excluded speech “pursuant to [public 
employees’] official duties” from protection in Garcetti v. Ceballos.24 For all 
other speech, public employees must satisfy a two-part test in order to claim 
First Amendment protection: (1) they must speak as citizens on matters of 
public concern (not merely internal workplace or personal matters), and (2) 
they must demonstrate that their interest in speaking outweighs the 
government interest in limiting the speech.25 This two-step test emerged 
when the Court first recognized that public employees have free speech 
rights.26 In Pickering v. Board of Education, teacher Marvin Pickering was 
fired after he wrote a letter to a local newspaper criticizing a proposed tax 
increase and the local board of education’s spending priorities.27 In 
evaluating whether Pickering could claim constitutional protection, the 
Court grappled with the tension between the government’s interest acting as 
an employer and an individual’s interest in speaking. On the one hand, the 
Court recognized that public employees contribute to informed decision-
making about government services.28 At the same time, the Court recognized 
that a state has an interest in providing public services in an efficient manner 
through its employees.29 Thus ensuring that public employers would retain 
significant latitude to supervise employees, the Pickering Court required 
that, at the outset, employees must show they are speaking on a matter of 
public concern before they can move to the second step, interest-balancing.30 
Fifteen years later, the Court clarified that employees must do more 
than show that the content of their speech could be important to the public. 
In Connick v. Myers, the Court held that an employee must demonstrate, with 
the content, form, and context of the statement, that she was speaking as a 
citizen on a matter of public concern, and not “as an employee upon matters 
 
 24 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006) (refusing to protect a deputy district attorney disciplined for writing a 
memorandum recommending dismissal of a case based on government misconduct). If an employer can 
show that the speech was within an employee’s job description, then the First Amendment simply does 
not come into play. Id. The way the Court has defined workplace speech now prevents most cases from 
even triggering First Amendment analysis. See Edward J. Schoen, Completing Government Speech’s 
Unfinished Business: Clipping Garcetti’s Wings and Addressing Scholarship and Teaching, 43 HASTINGS 
CONST. L.Q. 537, 538 (2016). 
 25 See Pickering, 391 U.S. at 574. 
 26 Id. 
 27 Id. at 566. Among Pickering’s complaints was the board’s decision to invest in a new athletic  
field. Id. 
 28 Id. at 571–72. The Court observed that “free and open debate is vital to informed decision-making 
by the electorate. . . . Accordingly, it is essential that [teachers] be able to speak out freely on such 
questions without fear of retaliatory dismissal.” Id. 
 29 Id. at 568. 
 30 Id. 
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only of personal interest.”31 In Connick, an assistant district attorney alleged 
she had been dismissed because she circulated a questionnaire to her 
colleagues asking about office morale and whether employees felt pressured 
to work on political campaigns.32 Applying its multifactor test, the Court held 
that the employee’s questionnaire was not designed to inform public debate 
or bring wrongdoing to light—it was instead merely an extension of the 
attorney’s ongoing dispute about being transferred.33 As the Court explained, 
“the First Amendment does not require a public office to be run as a 
roundtable for employee complaints over internal office affairs.”34 Even if 
the content of the speech is potentially significant to the public, it will not be 
protected if the form and context show that that the employee was really 
making an internal complaint. 
Thus, public employee speech doctrine has developed a restrictive 
definition of matters of public concern, permitting government employers 
wide latitude to supervise their employees. The Pickering–Connick 
framework’s public concern test takes certain speech out of the picture by 
categorizing it as outside constitutional protection. This classification allows 
a government employer to function more like a private one by providing a 
degree of predictability to government employers when they make internal, 
day-to-day, and supervisory decisions.35 Although a public employee 
probably cannot be fired for criticizing the President, she still could be fired 
for criticizing her boss.36 
C. Agency Fees Speech Doctrine 
The latitude the Court usually accords public employers stands in stark 
contrast to the Court’s recent holding in Janus that, in the agency fees 
context, virtually all speech by a public sector labor union on behalf of 
employees implicates the First Amendment.37 As this Section describes, 
public sector agency fees jurisprudence was fairly stable for nearly four 
 
 31 461 U.S. 138, 147–48 (1983) (emphasis added). 
 32 Id. at 141. 
 33 Id. at 148. 
 34 Id. at 149. Thus, an “employee grievance concerning internal office policy” is not entitled to 
protection. Id. at 154. The Court observed that “government offices could not function if every 
employment decision became a constitutional matter.” Id. at 143. 
 35 See id. at 149 (describing the need for government employers to supervise employees without 
fearing the workplace will become a town hall meeting). 
 36 Compare Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 379–80 (1987) (employee wrongly dismissed for 
criticizing the President), with Connick, 461 U.S. at 141 (employee legally fired for criticizing 
supervisor). 
 37 See Janus v. AFSCME, Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2472–77 (2018) (explaining that agency fees 
overwhelmingly speak to issues of public concern). 
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decades. First, in 1977, the Court established in Abood that government 
employers could permit unions to charge agency fees for representing 
nonmember employees so long as the fees were not used for political 
lobbying. Subsequent cases refined Abood’s application. Then in 2012, the 
Court indicated a willingness to reconsider the constitutionality of agency 
fees. Now, in the case of Janus, the Court has held that even speech about 
traditional topics of labor relations are a matter of public concern, and 
therefore agency fees are unconstitutional because they compel such speech. 
1. Unions and Agency Fees 
A brief description of labor unions and their funding mechanisms may 
first be helpful to understand the constitutional dimensions of agency fees. 
A labor union represents employees in collective bargaining, resolving 
grievances, and undertaking other forms of mutual aid.38 Both in the private 
and public sectors, workers form unions to improve their bargaining power 
as they negotiate terms of employment with an employer.39 Unions often ask 
an employer to negotiate a collective bargaining agreement, a contract that 
typically sets wages, benefits, and working conditions for all employees who 
share a common workplace or work unit.40 Employers may voluntarily 
recognize a union as the representative of its employees or may be required 
do so by statute when a majority of employees vote in favor of forming a 
union.41 Government employers were not permitted to recognize unions until 
the 1950s, when states and the federal government passed statutes to 
authorize it.42 This decision reflected the policy judgment that unions could 
facilitate improved labor relations, make negotiations more efficient, and 
provide an employee voice in bargaining and conflict resolution.43 
Unions are funded by member dues, which are often deducted directly 
from paychecks.44 Public employee union membership is voluntary because 
compulsory membership in such an organization would violate freedom of 
 
 38 KENNETH G. DAU-SCHMIDT ET AL., LABOR LAW IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORKPLACE 251–53 
(2009). 
 39 Id. Before joining the Court, Justice Holmes wrote about the need for workers to negotiate 
collectively with employers: “Combination on the one side is patent and powerful. Combination on the 
other is the necessary and desirable counterpart, if the battle is to be carried on in a fair and equal way.” 
Vegelahn v. Guntner, 44 N.E. 1077, 1081 (Mass. 1896). 
 40 DAU-SCHMIDT ET AL., supra note 38, at 540–41. 
 41 Id. at 280–81, 370. 
 42 Id. at 83–85. Despite this relatively late start, public sector unions now have both more members 
and higher rates of membership than their private counterparts. Id. 
 43 Id. at 3–7 (discussing the role of unions in labor relations generally); see also id. at 82–86 
(describing state and federal public labor relations acts, including Wisconsin’s groundbreaking statute in 
1959, President Kennedy’s executive order in 1962, and the federal statute in 1978). 
 44 Id. at 869; see, e.g., 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 315/6(f) (2005) (permitting union membership dues to be 
deducted directly from employees’ paychecks). 
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association.45 Many state statutes require public sector unions to represent all 
workers in a workplace, regardless of membership.46 These states also 
typically allow unions to charge nonmembers an agency fee (colloquially 
known as a “fair share fee”) to cover the costs of representation, and agency 
fee payers must receive the same wages and working conditions as a union 
member.47 Allowing unions to charge agency fees avoided a potential free-
rider problem in which workers could refuse to pay dues but still receive the 
benefits of bargaining collectively with employers.48 Until the Court’s 
decision in Janus, most unions representing public sector workers were 
agency shops funded by a mix of both union-member dues and nonmember 
agency fees.49 
2. Drawing the Line: Germane to Collective Bargaining 
Because unions speak on behalf of employees, agency fees that fund 
unions trigger potential free speech concerns. Spending money to express an 
idea is a form of protected speech recognized by the Court in the contexts of 
campaign spending50 and compelled commercial speech.51 Because spending 
money can be expressive, requiring an individual to pay a fee can unlawfully 
 
 45 N. PETER LAREAU, 2 LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW § 25.08 (Matthew Bender & Co., Inc. rev. 
ed. 2018). 
 46 DAU-SCHMIDT ET AL., supra note 38, at 892–94. 
 47 Id. at 868. These agency fee provisions now all appear to be unconstitutional under Janus. See 
Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Ruling Delivers a Sharp Blow to Labor Unions, N.Y. TIMES (June 27, 
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/27/us/politics/supreme-court-unions-organized-labor.html 
[https://perma.cc/HS4N-HQ4U] (predicting the Janus decision will affect public sector unions 
nationally). 
 48 DAU-SCHMIDT ET AL., supra note 38, at 867. The issue of “union security,” the question of whether 
a union must be the exclusive bargaining representative in order to operate, has been subject to much 
debate. See id. at 867–68. Professor Mancur Olson argued that, without compelled membership, no 
“rational worker . . . [would] voluntarily contribute to a (large) union providing a collective benefit since 
he alone would not perceptibly strengthen the union, and since he would get the benefits of any union 
achievements whether or not he supported the union.” MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE 
ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS 88 (1971). On the other hand, others argue that 
the unions representing federal employees demonstrate that it is possible for unions to survive without 
agency fees. Compare Janus v. AFSCME, Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2466 (2018) (concluding that 
federal employee unions show that agency fees are unnecessary for labor union survival), with Brief of 
Amici Curiae Economists and Professors of Law and Economics in Support of Respondents at 21–25, 
Janus, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (No. 16-1466) (arguing that agency fees are necessary for unions to operate 
effectively). 
 49 See LAREAU, supra note 45, § 25.08. 
 50 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19 (1976) (holding that expenditure limits on political candidates 
unconstitutionally restricted their speech). 
 51 United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405, 415–16 (2001) (holding unconstitutional a 
regulation that compelled producers to fund advertisements promoting the sale of mushrooms). 
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compel speech.52 Compelled speech can violate the First Amendment as 
surely as can a restraint on speech;53 for example, a school may not require a 
student to salute a flag or to say the Pledge of Allegiance.54 Thus, the Court’s 
jurisprudence has established that public sector agency fees raise 
constitutional concerns. 
In 1977, the Court first considered the constitutionality of agency fees 
for public sector employees. In Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, 
teachers challenged the state statute authorizing mandatory agency fees for 
employees who did not join the union.55 The plaintiffs argued that requiring 
them to pay agency fees violated their First Amendment rights.56 The 
plaintiffs objected not only to paying for both political and ideological 
activities to which they were opposed (including legislative lobbying and the 
support of political candidates) but also to paying for the act of collective 
bargaining itself.57 As in Pickering, the Court recognized that, when the 
government acts as an employer, its interests in dealing with its workforce 
are weightier than when it regulates its citizens.58 The Court held that the 
government has strong interests in the efficiency and simplicity of dealing 
with one exclusive representative, and in avoiding confusion and strife 
resulting from dealing with rival unions and multiple collective bargaining 
agreements.59 It acknowledged that the teachers paying agency fees had First 
Amendment interests as well but dismissed them as being no weightier than 
those of their private sector counterparts, whose compelled agency fees it 
had already blessed in Railway Employees’ Department v. Hanson.60 
The Court ultimately upheld the constitutionality of agency fees by 
distinguishing between expenses germane to collective bargaining and those 
 
 52 See id. at 411 (observing that “First Amendment values are at serious risk if the government can 
compel a particular citizen, or a discrete group of citizens, to pay special subsidies for speech on the side 
that it favors”). 
 53 Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977) (“[T]he right of freedom of thought protected by 
the First Amendment against state action includes both the right to speak freely and the right to refrain 
from speaking at all.”). 
 54 W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (observing that “[i]f there is any 
fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall 
be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by 
word or act their faith therein”). 
 55 431 U.S. 209, 209 (1977). 
 56 Id. at 213. The objecting teachers alleged that the union was engaged in “activities and programs 
which are economic, political, professional, scientific and religious in nature of which Plaintiffs do not 
approve, and in which they will have no voice.” Id. 
 57 Id. at 212–13. 
 58 See id. at 228–30. 
 59 Id. at 220–21. The Court also observed that exclusive representation “prevents inter-union rivalries 
from creating dissension within the work force.” Id. 
 60 Id. at 229–30. 
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for unrelated political lobbying, speech on behalf of political candidates, or 
advancement of unrelated ideological causes.61 So long as the charges were 
for the costs of actually representing the fee-payer, agency fees did not 
violate the fee-payer’s rights. The line drawn between activities germane to 
collective bargaining and political lobbying did not depend on the distinction 
between what is political and what is not, however. Quite the opposite: the 
Court acknowledged that unions engage in activities with political 
implications.62 It clarified that the “critical constitutional inquiry” was not 
whether the activities were “political.”63 The Court acknowledged that 
employees might view “the cause of unionism” itself as a political matter but 
found it significant that the collective bargaining agreement did not compel 
the employees to join the union, espouse its cause, or participate in any 
way.64 Thus, the Court squarely considered and rejected the plaintiffs’ key 
argument that public sector agency fees violate the First Amendment because 
collective bargaining is inherently political.65 
Subsequent litigation refined what expenses should be considered 
germane to collective bargaining. Beginning with Chicago Teachers Union 
v. Hudson, decided nine years after Abood, the Court held that unions must 
provide adequate information and procedural safeguards to agency fee 
payers to minimize the risk of infringing on free speech rights.66 Unions 
complied by providing annual “Hudson notices” with itemized lists of 
expenses charged to fee-payers.67 The Hudson Court also held that agency 
fees could only be used for payments to state and national union affiliates if 
the activities benefited the nonmembers.68 The Court extended this holding 
in the 1991 case of Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass’n, when it decided that 
unions could charge agency fee payers for activities that did not directly 
benefit the bargaining unit, but “[t]here must be some indication that the 
payment is for services that may ultimately inure to the benefit of the 
members of the local union.”69 According to the Court, it would cross the 
 
 61 Id. at 235–36. 
 62 Id. at 231 (observing that “[t]here can be no quarrel with the truism that because public employee 
unions attempt to influence governmental policymaking, their activities—and the views of members who 
disagree with them—may be properly termed political”). 
 63 Id. at 232. 
 64 Id. at 212. 
 65 Id. at 227–29. 
 66 475 U.S. 292, 309 (1986). 
 67 LAREAU, supra note 45, § 25.08. 
 68 Hudson, 475 U.S. at 309. 
 69 Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass’n, 500 U.S. 507, 524 (1991) (holding that while the union “need not 
demonstrate a direct and tangible impact upon the dissenting employee’s unit,” the local union does not 
have “carte blanche to expend dissenters’ dollars for bargaining activities wholly unrelated to the 
employees in their unit”). 
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line to “charge objecting employees for a direct donation or interest-free loan 
to an unrelated bargaining unit for the purpose of promoting employee rights 
or unionism generally.”70 Nor could the union charge nonmembers for its 
own public relations expenses or promoting workers’ rights generally.71 
Until Janus, the law appeared fairly settled as to which expenses were 
chargeable for agency fees.72 Unions were permitted to charge for costs 
associated with (1) negotiating and administering the collective bargaining 
agreement, including processing grievances, (2) the union’s national 
convention, (3) the union’s social activities, (4) certain litigation expenses, 
and (5) union publications, so long as they reported on other chargeable 
activities.73 In the last ten years, however, new plaintiffs called into question 
the underlying holding in Abood. 
3. An Invitation to Challenge Agency Fees 
Nearly four decades of agency fees jurisprudence had focused union 
critics’ battle on narrow questions of chargeability, notice, accounting, 
timing, and procedures for objecting.74 Then, in a pair of cases, Justice 
Samuel Alito laid the foundation for reassessing Abood’s distinction between 
collective bargaining and political lobbying. The Court first suggested it was 
open to reconsidering its precedent in Knox v. Service Employees 
International Union.75 In that case, the union had levied a temporary fee 
increase in order to oppose a ballot initiative in California that would have 
made it more difficult for unions to charge fees for political purposes.76 The 
Court held that even a temporary fee increase that is subsequently refunded 
violated agency fee payers’ rights.77 Justice Alito, who wrote for the 
majority, did not stop there. In dicta, he questioned whether collective 
bargaining was distinguishable from political lobbying for First Amendment 
 
 70 Id. 
 71 Id. 
 72 As Justice Elena Kagan observed in her dissent in Janus, only a handful of cases on chargeability 
reached the Court after Abood. Janus v. AFSCME, Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2498 (2018) (Kagan, J., 
dissenting); see also Martin H. Malin, The Evolving Law of Agency Shop in the Public Sector, 50 OHIO 
ST. L.J. 855, 861 (1989) (arguing that the chargeability test was not consistent with the narrow tailoring 
required of an infringement on a fundamental constitutional right). 
 73 See Malin, supra note 72, at 861–62; see also Catherine L. Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, Political 
Speech and Association Rights After Knox v. SEIU, Local 1000, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1023, 1038 (2013) 
(explaining how to apply the three-part chargeability test). 
 74 See Malin, supra note 72, at 861–63. 
 75 567 U.S. 298 (2012). 
 76 Id. at 304–05. The ballot proposition would have required affirmative consent from employees 
before unions could charge fees for political purposes. Id. at 303–04. The fee increase was also used to 
attempt to elect a sympathetic governor and legislature. The union failed to provide an opportunity for 
employees to opt out of the fees, although they did offer a full refund. Id. at 305. 
 77 Id. at 321. 
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purposes.78 He pointedly observed that “a public-sector union takes many 
positions during collective bargaining that have powerful political and civic 
consequences” and characterized agency fees as “a form of compelled 
speech and association that imposes a ‘significant impingement on First 
Amendment rights.’”79 Although the Court did not officially revisit Abood, 
observers saw Knox as a signal that the Court was ready to reconsider its 
precedent.80 
Two years later, in Harris v. Quinn, the Court declined to extend Abood 
to allow mandatory fees in an unusual quasi-public union of home care 
workers.81 Writing again for the majority, Justice Alito opined that Abood 
had ignored the difficulty of distinguishing between collective bargaining 
and political lobbying.82 As he saw it, “in the public sector, both collective-
bargaining and political advocacy and lobbying are directed at the 
government.”83 According to Justice Alito, Abood failed to understand that, 
“[i]n the public sector, core issues such as wages, pensions, and benefits are 
important political issues, but that is generally not so in the private sector.”84 
He thus characterized the proper agency fees inquiry as asking not whether 
the expense is germane to collective bargaining but rather whether the 
activity has political implications. Although the Court held the agency fee 
arrangement unconstitutional, it reserved the question of Abood’s 
constitutionality for another case.85 
4. Redrawing the Contours of Workplace Speech 
A new wave of plaintiffs accepted the invitation Justice Alito extended 
in Knox and Harris.86 In 2015, the Court granted certiorari in Friedrichs v. 
California Teachers Ass’n to directly reconsider the Abood precedent on the 
 
 78 See id. at 321–22. 
 79 Id. at 310–11 (quoting Ellis v. Bhd. of Ry., Airline & S.S. Clerks, 466 U.S. 435, 455 (1984)); see 
Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 73, at 1070 (observing that the majority opinion in Knox “casts doubt 
on the location of the line between chargeable germane expenses and nonchargeable political expenses”). 
 80 See, e.g., Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 73, at 1067 (observing that “the Court’s language and 
reasoning call[ed] into question the very existence of collective bargaining based on principles of 
exclusivity and majority rule”). 
 81 Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618, 2639 (2014). 
 82 See id. at 2632–34. Justice Alito’s lengthy dicta is particularly notable because the Court also 
expressly determined that Abood did not control the outcome of the case. See id. at 2639. 
 83 Id. at 2632–33. 
 84 Id. at 2632. 
 85 Id. at 2644. The case involved an unusual union of “quasi-public” home healthcare workers hired 
by private clients but statutorily deemed employees for purposes of union membership only. Id. at 2634–
35. The Court characterized its holding as a decision not to extend Abood. See id. at 2644. 
 86 See, e.g., Hill v. SEIU, 850 F.3d 861 (7th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 446 (2017); 
Complaint at 4, Yohn v. Cal. Teachers Ass’n, No. 8:17-cv-00202 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 6, 2017). 
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constitutionality of agency fees.87 The Court deadlocked 4–4 after Justice 
Antonin Scalia’s death; thus, the lower court decision upholding Abood 
remained in place. Two years later, the Court granted certiorari on the same 
question in Janus.88 The question in the case was whether to overrule Abood 
and declare public sector agency fees unconstitutional.89 
In Janus, the Court determined that agency fees are a far more egregious 
impingement on the First Amendment than the Abood Court had previously 
recognized.90 Once again writing for the Court, Justice Alito explained that 
compelled speech is an even greater injury to free speech than a mere 
restraint on speech.91 He next undertook a wholesale reconsideration of the 
government interest in labor peace and the prevention of free riders.92 
Contrary to the holding in Abood, Justice Alito concluded that agency fees 
are not essential to prevent employees from accepting the benefits of union 
representation without paying for it, and that agency fee funding is not 
necessary to ensure that unions can function as an exclusive representative 
of all employees.93 According to the Court, it would not cost significantly 
more to represent non-paying employees in collective bargaining and 
grievances, and the benefit unions would derive outweighs the burden.94 The 
Court applied the standard it announced in Knox, exacting scrutiny, to decide 
whether the government interest in agency fees is sufficient to justify the 
impingement on speech.95 The Court found that the government employer 
lacks the requisite compelling interest in the fees because—as a factual 
matter—agency fees are not necessary to preserve labor peace.96 Thus, 
agency fees cannot survive exacting scrutiny in the public sector. 
Justice Alito further explained that Abood was not only wrong about the 
government interest in agency fees but was also incorrect about the nature of 
union speech. In his discussion of why stare decisis did not counsel against 
overruling Abood, Justice Alito explained that the line Abood attempted to 
draw between speech germane to collective bargaining and political 
 
 87 Friedrichs v. Cal. Teachers Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 1083 (2016). 
 88 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at (i), Janus v. AFSCME, Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018) (No. 
16-1466); Brief for Petitioner at 11, Janus, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (No. 16-1466). 
 89 Supra note 88. 
 90 Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2464–65 (2018). 
 91 Id. at 2464. 
 92 Id. at 2465–69. 
 93 Id. at 2466–68. Justice Kagan sharply contested the Court’s conclusions here in dissent. Id. at 
2489–91 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 94 Id. at 2467–69 (majority opinion). 
 95 Id. at 2464–66, 2469. 
 96 Id. at 2465–66. 
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lobbying was fraught with conceptual difficulty.97 As he explained, Abood 
was logically flawed because, in the context of public sector collective 
bargaining, wages, pensions, and benefits are “important political issues.”98 
Thus, the Court concluded that all union speech that is compelled through 
agency fees is on matters of public concern.99 
But Justice Alito did not end his analysis there. He continued on to 
evaluate whether agency fees could be alternatively upheld under public 
employee speech doctrine’s Pickering framework. Although he initially 
dismissed Pickering as a “poor fit,” he went on to conduct a formal public 
employee speech doctrine analysis, concluding that agency fees still would 
not be upheld because they speak to government expenditures and other 
matters of public concern.100 First, he evaluated whether collective 
bargaining speaks on a matter of public concern.101 Justice Alito observed 
that the state of Illinois was in a budget crisis and that its expenditures on 
public employees and retirees were a large portion of its spending.102 As a 
result, the question of whether to reduce spending drove collective 
bargaining positions on both sides.103 Thus, speech about state expenditures 
was a matter of public concern.104 
Second, Justice Alito considered whether union speech on 
noneconomic issues could also be of public concern. He observed that other 
topics are discussed in collective bargaining, such as “education, child 
welfare, healthcare, and minority rights.”105 For example, he noted that, when 
educators are engaged in collective bargaining, the terms of employment also 
affect education policy, including seniority, merit pay, tenure, evaluation, 
and dismissal.106 Justice Alito suggested that even grievances, in which 
 
 97 Id. at 2480. One factor the Court considers in determining whether to overrule a prior case is the 
workability of the rule it had previously established. Id. at 2481–82. 
 98 Id. at 2480–81. 
 99 Id.; see also id. at 2460 (“We conclude that this arrangement violates the free speech rights of 
nonmembers by compelling them to subsidize private speech on matters of substantial public concern.”). 
 100 Id. at 2472–77. Justice Alito initially argued that Pickering requires “shoehorn[ing]” a test 
intended for cases involving one employee and single supervisory decisions. Id. at 2472–73. Because a 
public sector union may represent thousands of employees, its demands are more likely to implicate 
matters of public concern. Id. Further, because union speech is mouthed by a private party, as opposed to 
the employee in the course of official duties, Pickering’s interest-balancing step would require an 
adjustment to ensure greater protection. Id. at 2473. 
 101 Id. at 2474. Here, he expanded on the seeds planted in Harris, where the Court had noted that 
Illinois’s state expenditures, particularly on employee benefits, are “a matter of great public concern.” Id. 
(quoting Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618, 2642–43 (2014)). 
 102 Id. at 2474–75. 
 103 Id. at 2475. 
 104 Id. 
 105 Id. at 2475–76. 
 106 Id. 
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unions enforce the legally binding, agreed-upon terms of an employment 
contract, “may be of substantial public importance and may be directed at 
the public square.”107 While he left open the possibility that some union 
speech might be of only private interest, Justice Alito noted that on balance 
“the union speech at issue in this case is overwhelmingly of substantial 
public concern.”108 
When the Court delivered its answer as to the constitutionality of 
agency fees, it did not address the doctrinal repercussions on public 
employee speech more generally. Part II considers these repercussions and 
argues that, because the Court based its reasoning on the holding that unions 
and collective bargaining speak on matters of public concern, Janus will blur 
the previously stable lines in its sister doctrine. 
II. THE INTERTWINED NATURE OF AGENCY FEES AND PUBLIC  
EMPLOYEE SPEECH 
Two key holdings in Janus have implications for public employee 
speech doctrine. First, the Court’s declarations on matters of public concern 
will reverberate in public employee speech doctrine because the decision 
offered a new reading of Pickering, the core public employee speech case. 
Second, the Court’s reasoning as to why Abood was wrongly decided has 
repercussions for both agency fees and public employee speech because the 
two doctrines are interdependent. Thus, even if the Court had not offered a 
fresh interpretation of Pickering, its pronouncements about the inherently 
political nature of union speech in Janus and its other two recent agency fees 
decisions would disrupt public employee speech doctrine. 
In this Part, Section II.A details how the Janus decision has redefined 
what constitutes a matter of public concern for public employees. Section 
II.B demonstrates that public employee speech doctrine and agency fees 
jurisprudence are not only parallel but also interdependent. Section II.C 
evaluates whether the holding in Janus can be confined to agency fees. It 
concludes that the Court has failed to provide a limiting principle to confine 
the Janus decision to agency fees speech, and therefore, the Janus decision 
will shift how to analyze workplace speech in the public sector. 
 
 107 Id. at 2476–77 (internal quotation marks omitted). He cited an example of a union lawsuit to 
compel appropriations to pay for public employee wages, although he did not make clear whether it was 
the impact on expenditures or the public’s likely interest in the issue that made it of public concern. Id. 
 108 Id. at 2477. 
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A. Redefining Matters of Public Concern 
The Court in Janus offered a new reading of Pickering that expansively 
redefines matters of public concern. Writing for the majority, Justice Alito 
explained that, through collective bargaining and contract enforcement, 
public sector unions take positions on employee pay, benefits, evaluation, 
dismissal, grievances, and a variety of other workplace matters.109 Justice 
Alito contended that these topics implicate fundamental policy decisions and 
questions of how to allocate government expenditures, issues the Court in 
Harris had already determined are of “great public concern.”110 He further 
explained that unions also express views in collective bargaining on 
important subjects like education policy, child welfare, and healthcare.111 
Taken as a whole, the Court predicted that if the Pickering public employee 
speech test were applied to union speech, it would “overwhelmingly” be of 
public concern.112 
The Court’s new interpretation of Pickering thus eliminates a 
categorical presumption that “workplace speech” is outside the bounds of 
First Amendment protection. Beginning with Connick, cases interpreting 
Pickering had previously understood certain types of speech as categorically 
of only private interest.113 In some employee speech cases, individuals are 
disciplined for speech that is neither of public concern nor directed at the 
workplace. For example, the Court held that a police officer who produced 
sexually explicit videos off the job was neither speaking about his working 
conditions nor expressing a view on a topic of importance to the 
community.114 However, another significant subset of public employee 
expression has been “workplace speech,” matters that are focused on the 
employer–employee relationship or more generally on the internal 
operations of a government office.115 When employees have complained 
about internal office policy, criticized a supervisor, or raised other workplace 
grievances, they have been consistently denied protection because their 
 
 109 See supra Section I.C. 
 110 See supra Section I.C. 
 111 See supra Section I.C. 
 112 See supra Section I.C. 
 113 See supra Section I.B. 
 114 City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 83–84 (2004) (holding that a police officer did not speak 
on a matter of public concern when he made sexually explicit videos while wearing a police uniform). 
 115 Justice Kagan aptly described such expression as “core workplace speech” in her Janus dissent 
and as “internal workplace speech” in her Harris dissent. See Janus v. AFSCME, Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 
2448, 2493 (2018) (Kagan, J., dissenting); Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618, 2655 (2014) (Kagan, J., 
dissenting). 
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expression was employment-related, not of public concern.116 This left a 
great deal of speech outside the bounds of the First Amendment.117 
Until Janus, the line had been fairly stable. While scholars have 
observed that Pickering and Connick provided little guidance as to the line 
between workplace speech and a matter of public concern,118 courts reached 
an equilibrium, routinely classifying most speech about traditional 
employee–management issues as internal to the workplace and therefore not 
protected.119 Thus, modern public employee speech doctrine has been 
organized around the principle that some things employees say are so clearly 
internal to the workplace that they do not trigger First Amendment 
protections. 
While the Pickering–Connick public concern test focused on whether 
speech is directed at the workplace,120 the Court’s new reading of Pickering 
asks instead whether speech is of importance to the public. In so doing, the 
Janus Court set aside the other two factors it had established in Connick, the 
form and the context of the speech, and focused almost exclusively on its 
content.121 The Court’s omission was no accident. There is little in either the 
form or context of collective bargaining and grievances to indicate that they 
are aimed at the public square—employment contract negotiations and 
enforcement actions take place behind closed doors. In a sharp rebuke of this 
divergence, Justice Elena Kagan observed that the inquiry in Janus is now 
“whether the public is, or should be, interested in a government employee’s 
speech” as opposed to “whether that speech is about and directed to the 
workplace—as contrasted with the broader public square.”122 Janus 
represents a significant shift in how to read Pickering: instead of asking 
whether the speech is about a workplace matter, the Court asks whether the 
speech is of interest to the public at large. 
 
 116 Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2493; Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 2655. 
 117 The Court does not have a single, precise term for the converse of “matters of public concern” in 
the public employment context. It usually describes speech that does not trigger public concern as 
“private” or of “personal interest.” See, e.g., Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147 (1983). There is 
potential for confusion from describing speech in a public workplace as “private.” 
 118 Post, supra note 17, at 668 (“Although the ‘public concern’ test rests on a clean and superficially 
attractive rationale, the Court has offered virtually no analysis to develop its logic.”). 
 119 See RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SMOLLA & NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 18:10 (rev. ed. 2018). 
Generally, courts have considered the topics of traditional employee–management relations about hours, 
duties, overtime pay, evaluation, and conflicts with supervisors outside of public concern. 
 120 See supra Section I.B. 
 121 See supra Section I.C. 
 122 Janus v. AFSCME, Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2495 (2018) (Kagan, J., dissenting). In contrast, 
Justice Kagan argued, the Pickering–Connick inquiry had “asked whether the speech was truly of the 
workplace—addressed to it, made in it, and (most of all) about it.” Id. 
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Janus not only broadens this definition but also makes it even less 
precise. Even before Janus, scholars have noted that Pickering and Connick 
provided little guidance as to the definition of a matter of public concern, 
and results have been unpredictable ex ante.123 One scholar argues, for 
example, that the test is subjective and requires courts to make problematic 
judgments on the social utility of speech.124 Now, Janus retreats from a long-
established line that had excluded internal workplace speech from First 
Amendment protection. Accordingly, all matters are back on the table for 
public employees, so long as they are “a subject of legitimate news interest; 
that is, a subject of general interest and of value and concern to the public at 
the time of publication.”125 This makes protected speech in the government 
workplace closer to the protections that citizens claim in defamation law, 
which allows essentially any newsworthy expression to receive protection—
certainly a broad category in the contemporary media environment.126 In the 
context of defamation law, Professor Robert C. Post contends that, although 
the public concern test is superficially clean and attractive, the Court has 
offered virtually no analysis to guide judges how to apply it.127 In this area 
of law, matters of public concern now encompass both topics relevant to 
democratic decision-making and those that the public actually discusses, like 
celebrity gossip.128 The Janus decision has thus moved in the direction of a 
far more expansive view of matters of public concern in the government 
workplace. 
B. The Intertwined Nature of Agency Fees and Public Employee Speech 
As this Note argues, agency fees doctrine and public employee speech 
doctrine are interdependent because they govern precisely the same 
employees, the same employers, and largely the same topics of speech. Thus, 
 
 123 See, e.g., Randy J. Kozel, Reconceptualizing Public Employee Speech, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1007, 
1027 (2005); Lawrence Rosenthal, The Emerging First Amendment Law of Managerial Prerogative, 
77 FORDHAM L. REV. 33, 58 (2008). 
 124 Toni M. Massaro, Significant Silences: Freedom of Speech in the Public Sector Workplace, 61 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 1, 27–28 (1987) (“[U]nder Connick the courts must assess the social utility of employee 
speech twice—first, in determining whether the speech falls within the amendment, and again in 
determining whether speech within the amendment can be restricted.”). 
 125 City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 83–84 (2004) (holding that a police officer did not speak 
on a matter of public concern when he made sexually explicit videos while wearing a police uniform). 
 126 See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–81 (1964). 
 127 Post, supra note 17, at 668–69 (“Indeed, as matters now stand, the test of ‘public concern’ 
‘amounts to little more than a message to judges and attorneys that no standards are necessary because 
they will, or should, know a public concern when they see it.’” (quoting Arlen W. Langvardt, Public 
Concern Revisited: A New Role for an Old Doctrine in the Constitutional Law of Defamation, 21 VAL. 
U. L. REV. 241, 259 (1987))). 
 128 Id. at 668–74. 
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even if Justice Alito had not directly addressed Pickering, the core public 
employee speech case, the Court’s decision to overrule Abood would have 
had repercussions in its sister doctrine. Janus merely cements a view the 
Court expressed in two prior cases that the core topics of union speech are 
inherently political. 
The Court recognizes that “the government as employer indeed has far 
broader powers than does the government as sovereign.”129 These additional 
powers give a government employer greater latitude in relation to its 
employees in multiple dimensions of employee relations, including search 
and seizure, due process, and speech.130 This is grounded in the recognition 
that the Court has “long held the view that there is a crucial difference, with 
respect to constitutional analysis, between the government exercising ‘the 
power to regulate or license, as lawmaker,’ and the government acting ‘as 
proprietor, to manage [its] internal operation.’”131 In the context of public 
employee speech, the government may operate with wide latitude so long as 
an employee is not speaking as a citizen on a matter of public concern. What 
is more, both agency fees doctrine and public employee speech doctrine 
depended until now on delineating between speech on matters that are 
internal to the workplace (and thus unprotected) and speech on matters 
transcending the workplace (and thus protected). Any changes to this line are 
likely to affect both areas of law—they must cohere or risk creating 
inconsistencies. 
Others recognize the overlap in approach to First Amendment line-
drawing between the two doctrines. In Justice Kagan’s view, compelled 
agency fees are in fact a subset of “the government’s regulation of its 
workforce.”132 In her dissent in Janus, she observed that both Pickering and 
Abood drew a line of constitutional importance to separate expression related 
to the government’s managerial interests from those that are not.133 Likewise, 
in their amicus brief in Janus, Professors Charles Fried and Robert C. Post 
argued that “[p]ublic-sector bargaining regimes involve the same state 
 
 129 Engquist v. Or. Dep’t of Agric., 553 U.S. 591, 598 (2008) (quoting Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 
661, 671 (1994) (plurality opinion)). 
 130 See id. at 598–600 (describing the Court’s holdings giving public employers latitude vis-à-vis 
warrant requirements, due process protections from discharge, and regulations of public employee 
speech). 
 131 Id. at 598 (alteration in original) (quoting Cafeteria & Rest. Workers Union, Local 473 v. 
McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 896 (1961)) (holding that a class-of-one theory of equal protection is not 
cognizable in the public employment context). 
 132 Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618, 2654 (2014) (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 133 Janus v. AFSCME, Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2492–93 (2018) (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
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managerial prerogatives to which the Court has expressed deference” in its 
public employee speech jurisprudence.134 
Because the two jurisprudential areas are so closely related, the Court’s 
recent pronouncements on the political nature of agency fees will alter how 
public employee speech doctrine classifies workplace expression. In its trio 
of agency fees cases in Knox, Harris, and Janus, the Court has repeatedly 
expressed the view that collective bargaining, or union speech generally, is 
inherently political and thus implicates the First Amendment. According to 
the Court, it is difficult to distinguish collective bargaining from political 
lobbying,135 it has “powerful political and civic consequences,”136 and it 
“involves inherently ‘political’ speech.”137 Further, public employee “wages, 
pensions, and benefits,” the topics of collective bargaining, “are important 
political issues.”138 These statements amount to a determination that when 
public employees speak about the traditional topics of collective bargaining, 
and when unions speak, this expression is categorically a matter of public 
concern. Unlike speech of merely private concern, these topics now trigger 
the potential for First Amendment protection. 
C. In Search of a Limiting Principle 
Janus fails to provide a limiting principle that would confine a newly 
expansive definition of matters of public concern from altering public 
employee speech doctrine. While Justice Alito explained why he believed 
Pickering does not apply to Janus,139 he did not address the converse: Why 
would Janus not affect Pickering? Indeed, Justice Alito acknowledged that, 
under the right facts, employees who are reprimanded for agitating on 
 
 134 Brief for Amici Curiae Charles Fried & Robert C. Post in Support of Neither Party, supra note 
14, at 7. 
 135 See Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 2632–34; Knox v. SEIU, Local 1000, 567 U.S. 298, 321 (2012). 
 136 Knox, 567 U.S. at 310. 
 137 Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2480 (quoting Abood v. Detroit Bd. Of Educ, 431 U.S. 209, 226 (1977)). The 
Court considered and rejected some of these arguments in Abood in 1977. Justice Powell, concurring in 
the judgment in Abood, failed to persuade the Court that “no principled distinction” existed between a 
public sector union and a political candidate or committee. Abood, 431 U.S. at 256 (Powell, J., concurring 
in the judgment). The majority in Abood observed that collective bargaining “may be properly termed 
political” because it constitutes an “attempt to influence governmental policymaking.” Id. at 231. Thus, 
the latitude the Court provided to accommodate the government interest in labor peace in Abood was no 
accident. 
 138 Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2480 (quoting Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 2632). 
 139 Id. at 2472–74, 2477 n.23. The Court was well aware that many insist that the Pickering public 
employee speech framework, with its matter of public concern test, should apply to agency fees, or that 
the frameworks should at least cohere. The State of Illinois made this argument in Harris. 134 S. Ct. at 
2641. Justice Kagan argued for it in her dissents in Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 2653–56 (Kagan, J., dissenting), 
and Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2492–97 (Kagan, J., dissenting). Numerous briefs in Friedrichs and Janus 
discussed the issue. See Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2469–71 (majority opinion). 
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workplace topics like merit pay or health benefits could have a First 
Amendment case.140 
Nonetheless, there might be sound reasons why public employee speech 
doctrine need not shift, despite the Court’s declarations about the public 
concern test. First, it might be significant that agency fees affect public 
expenditures. Second, it could be important that agency fees aggregate 
speech through a labor union and thus make it more powerful than the same 
message from an individual speaker. As discussed below, however, neither 
of these features is exclusive to agency fees, and consequently, Janus cannot 
avoid generating serious problems for a government employer supervising 
its workforce. 
First, agency fees could be special because they affect public 
expenditures. According to the Court, public sector unions helped achieve 
generous retirement packages, contributing to the State of Illinois’s “$160 
billion in unfunded pension and retiree healthcare liabilities.”141 For this 
reason, the Court declared that these expenditures are “matters . . . of great 
public concern.”142 No threshold has been identified below which a public 
expenditure would be too small to satisfy the public concern test.143 After all, 
Janus declared agency fees for collective bargaining are unconstitutional 
even for the tiniest of unions. In such a context, the dollar amounts are likely 
to be quite small, implying that the price tag of a proposal does not have 
constitutional significance. It also is unclear whether expenditures need have 
any policy implications beyond an impact on public finances before they 
trigger public concern.144 Agency fees sometimes speak to very small public 
expenditures or ones that do not clearly implicate any policy consequences 
beyond government spending. Government workers, particularly if they are 
speaking as a group of two or more, could demonstrate that their expression 
takes positions with similar implications for public expenditures. Just as 
 
 140 Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2477 n.23. 
 141 Id. at 2474–75. 
 142 Id. at 2475. 
 143 As Justice Kagan said in Harris, “[N]owhere has the Court ever suggested, as the majority does 
today, . . . that if a certain dollar amount is at stake (but how much, exactly?), the constitutional treatment 
of an employee’s expression becomes any different.” 134 S. Ct. at 2655 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 144 Consider, for example, a hypothetical posed at oral argument in Friedrichs as to whether a 
mileage reimbursement policy negotiated in collective bargaining would satisfy the public concern test. 
Counsel for Friedrichs suggested that mileage reimbursement is a topic of public bargaining that does 
not present a policy question, presumably because it is so obviously uncontroversial or unimportant. Yet 
at least some Justices appeared to think even such a topic would be a matter of public concern. Chief 
Justice John Roberts insisted, “That’s money. That’s how much money is going to have to be paid to the 
teachers. . . . And the amount of money that’s going to be allocated to public education as opposed to 
public housing, welfare benefits, that’s always a public policy issue.” See Transcript of Oral Argument at 
46–47, Friedrichs v. Cal. Teachers Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 1083 (2016) (No. 14-915). 
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unions discuss wages, benefits, and workplace matters with policy 
implications, so too can public employees outside of a union context. Thus, 
agency fees do not uniquely implicate public expenditures. 
Nor should speech satisfy the public concern test solely on the basis that 
it implicates public expenditures. A few pennies or dollars should not by 
itself turn workplace speech into matters of public concern. Indeed, in 
Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, another First Amendment case, the Court 
held there was no matter of public concern implicated when a police chief 
demanded $338 in overtime pay and criticized the operations of the borough 
council.145 It seems a stretch to argue that such mileage reimbursement would 
categorically meet the Court’s requirement, especially if the policy extended 
to a small number of employees or required only minimal expenditures.146 
Second, it might be significant that the speech is either aggregated or 
that it affects a large number of employees.147 Agency fees are aggregated 
with union dues across an entire bargaining unit and combined with member 
dues to fund a union. Together, this could magnify the effect of the speech, 
whether it is about government expenditures or public policy issues. 
Although an agency fee payer might only contribute a few hundred dollars 
per year, the effect of the speech may be amplified beyond the nominal 
amount. For example, in Harris, the Court asserted that when a “powerful 
union” speaks on topics affecting public expenditures like Medicaid funding, 
such speech is different than cases like Connick where the expression was a 
“matter[] of only private concern” and dealt with “one employee’s 
dissatisfaction.”148 As the Court noted in Janus, unions may have thousands 
of members, and thus, a demand for a 5% raise for many thousands of 
employees could have a serious impact on the state budget.149 
Aggregation, however, is not a workable line because then the relative 
size or strength of the union would have constitutional implications. Some 
bargaining units for large urban school districts have tens of thousands of 
 
 145 564 U.S. 379, 384, 398–99 (2011) (suggesting the police chief’s demand was a “purely private 
concern” and remanding to the district court for findings). 
 146 City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 83–85 (2004) (holding that a police officer did not speak 
on a matter of public concern when he made sexually explicit videos while wearing a police uniform). 
 147 At oral argument in Friedrichs, Justice Kennedy suggested that the crucial difference from 
Pickering is that agency fees compel a group of people to speak, as opposed to restricting individual 
employee speech. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 144, at 56. Justice Kennedy contended, “[I]f 
you use Pickering in this case, you’re committing error of composition. You’re comparing a whole group 
of persons who have their views coerced or compelled against one person that . . . Pickering is just 
inapplicable on that . . . ground.” Id. 
 148 Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 2643. 
 149 Janus v. AFSCME, Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2472 (2018). 
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members,150 but state and federal statutes allow unions to form even in a tiny 
public workplace. For example, the Illinois Public Labor Relations Act 
allows just five employees to form a bargaining unit.151 Adjustments in 
wages and benefits for such a small group of workers seem unlikely to have 
a significant effect on the state, yet for First Amendment purposes, the fees 
spent to fund small unions are treated no differently than those funding a 
large union. The Janus decision does not prohibit agency fees for only large 
or influential unions. Furthermore, two or more public employees speaking 
as a group could demonstrate that their expression, like union speech, is just 
as aggregated and significant as that of a small bargaining unit. 
A third and final feature of agency fees that could make it 
distinguishable from other forms of speech is that it is compelled speech. 
One of the Janus Court’s central criticisms of Abood is that it failed to 
understand that, when agency fees compel speech, the effect is a greater 
impingement than restricted speech.152 However, this is a difference of 
degree, not kind. The distinction can explain the proper level of scrutiny 
(exacting) and the required weight of the government interest 
(compelling).153 This difference would not make it easier to satisfy the 
threshold question of whether the expression was on a matter of public 
concern.154 
What now is left to protect the managerial interests of a government 
employer? First, public employee speech doctrine still appears to 
categorically exclude speech in furtherance of official duties from First 
Amendment protection.155 Second, even if more speech can clear Pickering’s 
public concern test, the framework continues to protect managerial interests 
at its second step. One scholar observes that the Pickering test provides the 
 
 150 For example, the Chicago Teachers Union represents nearly 25,000 members. About Us, 
CHICAGO TEACHERS UNION, https://www.ctunet.com/about [https://perma.cc/4VAM-N7NL]. 
 151 Illinois Public Labor Relations Act, 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 315 (2005). The statute reduced the 
minimum number of employees in a bargaining unit from thirty-five to five. Id. 
 152 Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2473–74. 
 153 See id. at 2464–65. The level of scrutiny for agency fees is somewhere between exacting and 
strict, and the government must show a compelling interest. Id. at 2477 (“The exacting scrutiny standard 
we apply in this case was developed in the context of commercial speech, another area where the 
government has traditionally enjoyed greater-than-usual power to regulate speech.”). Janus reserved the 
question of what level of scrutiny applies to agency fees. Id. at 2464–65. 
 154 Similarly, in defamation law, the burden for proving libel is heightened when the plaintiff is a 
public figure, but the definition of matters of public concern remains the same. See N.Y. Times Co. v. 
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964) (imposing an actual malice standard for libel of public officials). 
 155 See Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2474 (describing Garcetti as relevant when employees are “paid to write 
or speak for the purpose of furthering the interests of their employers”); Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 
410, 421 (2006). 
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government significant latitude at the second step.156 She has argued for 
discarding the public concern test entirely on the grounds that the test is 
subjective and requires courts to make problematic judgments on the social 
utility of speech.157 Even before Janus, the results of the public concern test 
have been unpredictable ex ante.158 Unfortunately for the government 
employer, if they must rely on Pickering’s interest-balancing step to regulate 
speech, the results are likely to be even less predictable because balancing 
an employee’s interest in her speech against the employer’s interest in 
restricting it is a highly fact-intensive inquiry.159 Thus, post-Janus employee 
speech claims are more likely to proceed further in litigation.160 
The Court itself has recognized a need for consistency within First 
Amendment doctrine. The majority in Knox expressed concern as to whether 
agency fees received anomalous treatment.161 The Court’s insistence on 
greater uniformity in First Amendment jurisprudence demands a principled 
reason for limiting the inevitable impact of Janus on public employee speech 
doctrine. Although the Court has suggested that collective bargaining’s 
impact on the public fisc or the powerful voice of a public union make 
agency fees different than other public employee speech, these distinctions 
provide neither a workable nor satisfying rationale for treating these two 
types of expression differently. Thus, it will not to be possible to cabin 
Janus’s holdings to agency fees jurisprudence. As the Court recognized in 
Connick, “[t]o presume that all matters which transpire within a government 
office are of public concern would mean that virtually every remark—and 
certainly every criticism directed at a public official—would plant the seed 
of a constitutional case.”162 The Janus decision has sown these seeds. In the 
next Part, this Note explores the doctrinal consequences of Janus, including 
 
 156 See Massaro, supra note 124, at 28 (“[U]nder Connick the courts must assess the social utility of 
employee speech twice—first, in determining whether the speech falls within the amendment, and again 
in determining whether speech within the amendment can be restricted.”). 
 157 Id. 
 158 See, e.g., Kozel, supra note 123; Rosenthal, supra note 123. 
 159 See SMOLLA, supra note 119, § 18:26 (observing that currently courts often resolve employee 
speech claims as a matter of law at step one of Pickering). 
 160 Fact-intensive claims are more likely to survive motions for summary judgment. See 
10A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 2712 (4th ed. 2018) 
(explaining that one purpose of the federal summary judgment rule is to preserve resources for cases with 
genuine factual disputes); see also Martin H. Redish, Summary Judgment and the Vanishing Trial: 
Implications of the Litigation Matrix, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1329, 1330 (2005) (arguing that shifts heightening 
the summary judgment standard have contributed to the reduction in the number of cases that go to trial). 
 161 Knox v. SEIU, Local 1000 567 U.S. 298, 311 (2012) (“Acceptance of the free-rider argument as 
a justification for compelling nonmembers to pay a portion of union dues represents something of an 
anomaly—one that we have found to be justified by the interest in furthering ‘labor peace.’ But it is an 
anomaly nevertheless.” (citation omitted)). 
 162 Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 149 (1982). 
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its pronouncements that matters involving unions, public expenditures, and 
public policy are inherently of concern to the public. 
III. IMPLICATIONS FOR PUBLIC EMPLOYEE SPEECH DOCTRINE 
This Note argues that the Court’s decision in Janus is likely to 
destabilize public employee speech doctrine. What had once been presumed 
internal disputes could become constitutional issues. This Part considers the 
implications that follow from this doctrinal shift in the definition of matters 
of public concern in a government workplace. A few scenarios emerge that 
would reach different results under Janus. The Court’s new reading of 
Pickering’s public concern test and its declaration that union speech is 
inherently political would allow three kinds of speech to more easily clear 
the first step of Pickering.163 Public employees would have a strong basis for 
claiming protection for (1) speech on union-related topics, (2) speech as a 
union official, and (3) speech about workplace matters that could trigger 
public interest. Thus, the long-established line between public and workplace 
matters could erode, providing a new basis for public employees to claim 
constitutional protections for workplace speech. 
A. Union-Related Speech 
Courts have only rarely declared that certain topics are inherently 
matters of public concern—for example, public voting or reports of official 
misconduct.164 For union-related speech, courts prior to Janus applied the 
multifactor Connick test, examining the content, form, and context of the 
speech.165 While some circuits held that public employee speech about 
unions usually qualifies for free speech protections,166 others conducted a 
more searching, fact-specific analysis.167 Multiple courts declared that not all 
 
 163 See supra Section I.B. 
 164 See, e.g., Davignon v. Hodgson, 524 F.3d 91, 101 (1st Cir. 2008) (explaining the court’s cautious 
approach to deeming specific topics as inherently matters of public concern). 
 165 See SMOLLA, supra note 119, § 18:12.50 (“There is no clear, clean answer, and courts have 
reached different results, depending on the context and content of the particular union-related speech.”); 
5 EMPLOYMENT COORDINATOR § 1:19 (2018) (“There is no per se rule regarding whether union-related 
speech by a public employee is protected by the First Amendment; it may or may not address a matter of 
public concern.”). 
 166 See, e.g., Clue v. Johnson, 179 F.3d 57, 61 (2d Cir. 1999) (noting that union activities that 
“necessarily entail a substantial criticism of management raise matters of public concern”). 
 167 Thomas v. Del. State Univ., 626 F. App’x 384, 388–89 (3d Cir. 2015) (“While it is true that union 
activities may sometimes touch on a matter of public concern, it is not the case that all union-related 
grievances do . . . .” (citation omitted)); Torres v. Pueblo Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, No. 98-1412, 2000 WL 
1346347, at *4 (10th Cir. Sept. 19, 2000) (stating the court is “unwilling to hold that an employee’s speech 
or activity touches on a matter of public concern merely because it is union-related”). 
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union-related speech is a matter of public concern.168 For example, courts 
have held that employees at a jail had no right to post a memorandum urging 
their coworkers to invoke their rights to union representation in the midst of 
an investigation into prescription drug trafficking169 and that a state prison 
psychologist’s speech in his capacity as union representative was merely an 
employee grievance and not a matter of public concern.170 However, because 
the Janus Court declared that union activity is inherently a matter of public 
concern, many of these union activity retaliation cases could turn out 
differently, with employee speech about union representation and collective 
bargaining agreements falling on the other side of the line.171 
B. Speaking as a Union Official 
The Janus Court’s holding about union-related speech can help public 
employees satisfy another part of the public employee speech framework: 
speaking as a citizen. To be successful, an employee must show (1) she was 
not speaking merely as an employee (under Connick and Pickering) and (2) 
she was not speaking pursuant to her official duties (under Garcetti).172 This 
had not been an easy task in the doctrinal framework that existed prior to 
Janus. The Janus decision appears to have changed that. As the Janus Court 
noted, collective bargaining and contract enforcement are not related to an 
employee’s official duties under Garcetti.173 And the Court declared these 
activities to be “inherently political speech” of “great public concern.”174 
If all speech by a union is inherently of public concern, then employees 
who also serve as union officials should be able to claim protection. A 
number of circuits already hold that when individuals speak in a union 
capacity, they speak as citizens, and not as employees.175 Other circuits have 
 
 168 See Davignon, 524 F.3d at 102 (noting that an individual employee persuading fellow employees 
to attend a union picket showed both elements of personal grievance and matters of public concern); 
Boals v. Gray, 775 F.2d 686, 693 (6th Cir. 1985) (noting that an employee did not speak on a matter of 
public concern when he requested a union representative and received an extra two days of suspension in 
retaliation). 
 169 Gillis v. Miller, 845 F.3d 677, 687 (6th Cir. 2017). 
 170 Olendzki v. Rossi, 765 F.3d 742, 749 (7th Cir. 2014). 
 171 Janus v. AFSCME, Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2480 (2018). 
 172 See supra Section I.B. 
 173 Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2474 (observing that, “when a union negotiates with the employer or 
represents employees in disciplinary proceedings, the union speaks for the employees, not the employer”). 
 174  See id. at 2480, then id. at 2475. 
 175 See, e.g., Boulton v. Swanson, 795 F.3d 526, 534 (6th Cir. 2015) (“It is axiomatic that an 
employee’s job responsibilities do not include acting in the capacity of a union member, leader, or 
official. . . . We therefore hold that speech in connection with union activities is speech ‘as a citizen’ for 
the purposes of the First Amendment.”); Hubbard v. Clayton Cty. Sch. Dist., 756 F.3d 1264, 1268 (11th 
Cir. 2014) (holding that a school employee who was “on-loan” to serve as president of educators’ 
association was not acting in furtherance of official duties); Ellins v. City of Sierra Madre, 710 F.3d 1049, 
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been more reluctant. For example, when police officers engaged in ongoing, 
heated conversations with management to advocate for the department 
implementation of twelve-hour shifts, the Third Circuit flatly rejected the 
argument that “union activity is per se protected conduct” for purposes of 
Garcetti analysis.176 Similarly, an assistant fire chief offering advice to 
fellow employees about the collective bargaining agreement was excluded 
from protection because the Eleventh Circuit held that his fellow employees 
sought him out due to his position as fire chief; thus, his speech was pursuant 
to his official role under Garcetti.177 Likewise, when a deputy sheriff who 
served as union vice president approached a superior to raise public safety 
concerns about mandatory overtime and lack of breaks between shifts, the 
Seventh Circuit carefully parsed the conversations to determine whether the 
deputy was speaking in a union capacity or as “a disgruntled employee, not 
a citizen.”178 
Following Janus, the Court has now clarified that union activity is 
inherently of public concern. Thus, a public employee acting as a union 
official, or perhaps even as a union member, could satisfy the Pickering–
Connick–Garcetti requirement of speaking as a citizen. 
C. Workplace Speech on Everyday Employment Matters 
While the Court in Janus declared that union speech is of great public 
concern because the topics of collective bargaining affect public 
expenditures and public policy, it provided no guidance as to when other 
speech affecting public expenditures and policy issues might also be 
constitutionally important. This has reopened the possibility of affording 
protection to a whole range of topics for public employees. An employee 
who objects to being assigned overtime work, criticizes a supervisor’s 
allocation of resources, or advocates for more compensation might have a 
constitutional case. For example, at oral argument in Harris, Justice Scalia 
 
1060 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding that the inherent conflict of interest between an employer and a union is 
evidence that acting as a union representative is not speaking in furtherance of official duties); Nagle v. 
Village of Calumet Park, 554 F.3d 1106, 1123 (7th Cir. 2009) (holding that statements made in the context 
of being the union official were not made pursuant to official duties). 
 176 Killion v. Coffey, 696 F. App’x. 76, 79 n.4 (3d Cir. 2017); see also Thomas v. Del. State Univ., 
626 F. App’x. 384, 388–89 (3d Cir. 2015) (“While it is true that union activities may sometimes touch on 
a matter of public concern, . . . it is not the case that all union-related grievances do . . . . [Plaintiff’s] 
grievances related to ‘working conditions and other issues in union members’ employment,’ and 
[Plaintiff] offers nothing that would transform those personnel matters into issues of interest to the broader 
community.”). 
 177 Moss v. City of Pembroke Pines, 782 F.3d 613, 619 (11th Cir. 2015). 
 178 Graber v. Clarke, 763 F.3d 888, 897 (7th Cir. 2014). The court concluded that only where he 
invoked the collective bargaining agreement in the conversations and did not speak in an insubordinate 
and hostile manner was he speaking as a citizen. Id. at 898. 
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pressed the petitioner’s counsel as to whether an individual employee who 
discusses his own wages is speaking on a matter of public concern.179 
Likewise, Justice Kagan argued in Janus that, when employees agitate 
collectively around issues like merit pay or health benefits, they would be 
able to claim protection under the Court’s new view of public concern.180 
Indeed, Justice Alito acknowledged that, under the right facts, these 
employees could succeed.181 
The Court stopped short of declaring that all union grievances are 
matters of public concern, but it indicated that some almost certainly are.182 
This could allow some employee grievances to clear both the Pickering–
Connick requirement of speaking as a citizen and the Garcetti limit on speech 
pursuant to official duties, leading to different results.183 For example, when 
a teacher filed a grievance with the union “to complain about his supervisor’s 
failure to discipline a child in his classroom,” the Second Circuit held that he 
was “speaking pursuant to his official duties and thus not as a citizen.”184 
Accordingly, the teacher’s speech was not protected by the First 
Amendment, and the court did not address whether it was on a “matter of 
public concern.”185 If this teacher could show his grievance complained not 
primarily about an individual decision by a supervisor but instead about the 
school’s disciplinary policy, then the employee could make a case that he 
had spoken chiefly about a matter of education policy. Likewise, a teacher 
facing retaliation for her complaints about outdated textbooks or inadequate 
resources might make an argument that her expression was centered on the 
impact on public expenditures or the public policy implications, as opposed 
to the private impact on her job duties. 
Going forward, when courts apply this new reading, i.e., that matters of 
public concern are topics that are “important,” they will be forced to 
conclude that workplace speech is back on the table for step one of Pickering. 
So long as employees can demonstrate that such speech is of sufficient 
importance to the public, they should be able to demand protection for 
 
 179 Transcript of Oral Argument at 7, Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618 (2014) (No. 11-681). Posing 
a hypothetical scenario of an individual police officer complaining to the police commissioner about his 
wages, Justice Scalia said, “It seems to me it’s always a matter of public concern, whether you’re going 
to raise the salaries of policemen, whether it’s an individual policeman or . . . a combination of policemen 
or a union. It’s always a matter of public concern, isn’t it?” Id. 
 180 Janus v. AFSCME, Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2496 (2018) (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 181 Id. at 2477 n.23. 
 182 See id. at 2476–77 (explaining that grievances speak on a public policy issue when their goal is 
to force the state to allocate funds for contractually agreed-upon raises). 
 183 See supra Section I.B. 
 184 Weintraub v. Bd. of Educ., 593 F.3d 196, 201 (2d Cir. 2010). 
 185 Id. 
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workplace-related speech. If employee speech qualifies as a matter of public 
concern in one of the three categories above, that is not the end of the matter. 
Once an employee demonstrates at the first step of Pickering that she was 
speaking on a matter of public concern, she faces a second hurdle—
Pickering’s balancing test.186 She must demonstrate that her interest in 
speaking outweighed the potential harm to her employer. 
Without a line demarcating what constitutes a workplace matter, the 
problem of turning ordinary workplace disputes into constitutional cases 
reemerges. Public employees both make and implement decisions with 
implications for public expenditures and public policy. They undoubtedly 
have opinions on the allocation of public resources within their agency, 
office, or school. Compensation, merit pay, work duties, evaluation, 
promotion, and seniority can affect public expenditures and the provision of 
public services, and sometimes both.187 Extending the First Amendment to 
all of these topics would stretch public employee protections to an 
unmanageable degree. It is also contrary to the Supreme Court’s recognition 
that the government needs wide latitude when acting as an employer, as 
opposed to a sovereign.188 As Justice William Brennan acknowledged in his 
dissent in Connick v. Myers, certain forms of employee expression are 
certainly speech, but they should not be subject to First Amendment 
protection if uttered by an employee.189 If an employee is directed to perform 
a task related to his job, common sense dictates that, in most cases, saying 
“no” should remain a lawful reason to discipline or fire him. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court’s decision to overrule Abood is predicted to dramatically 
curtail the resources and political strength of public sector unions, thus 
reducing public employee power and voice.190 An accompanying shift in the 
line between workplace speech and matters of public concern, however, 
offers welcome footing for litigants to claim free speech protections for a 
wide range of union- and employment-related speech. When employees 
 
 186 Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968); see also supra Section II.C. 
 187 Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2474–77. 
 188 See Engquist v. Or. Dep’t of Agric., 553 U.S. 591, 598–600 (2008) (describing the Court’s 
holdings giving public employers latitude vis-à-vis warrant requirements, due process protections from 
discharge, and regulations of public employee speech). 
 189 Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 165 n.3 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 190 See Liptak, supra note 47 (predicting that unions will lose millions of dollars in funding and 
become less effective). See generally Maria O’Brien Hylton, Friedrichs and the Move Toward Private 
Ordering of Wages and Benefits in the Public Sector, 23 CONN. INS. L.J. 177 (2016) (describing a 
devastating overall decline in public union membership and revenue following the end of statutorily 
authorized agency fees in Wisconsin). 
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agitate on the conditions of employment, particularly with fellow employees, 
they now have a stronger First Amendment basis to claim protection from 
retaliation. This may be cold comfort to those concerned about the vitality 
and ultimate survival of public unions, but it does point a new and potentially 
fruitful direction for those who continue to advocate for workers’ rights. 
For those who care about the efficient delivery of our public services, 
there is reason to be alarmed. The resulting doctrinal uncertainties threaten 
to cause significant confusion for government employers attempting to 
comport with the requirements of the First Amendment. The Court has 
repeatedly asserted its concern that an “[u]nrestrained application” of the 
First Amendment in government employment could interfere with the 
government’s ability to manage its internal operations.191 The scenario that 
every employment decision could become a constitutional matter seemed far 
from the realm of possibility so long as a line remained between internal 
workplace matters and matters of public concern. At least for the near future, 
this scenario now appears more likely. 
 
 191 Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, 564 U.S. 379, 390–91 (2011). 
